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Structural priming to study scopal representations and operations 
Chemla Emmanuel and Lewis Bott 
 
Abstract 
Sentences can be ambiguous with respect to which expressions “take scope” over 
others. For example, Every student read a book can be understood as meaning that all 
students read a (possibly different) book or that there is a single book read by all 
students. Previous work by Raffray and Pickering (2010) has shown that if people are 
exposed to one of the two interpretations, they can be primed to interpret subsequent 
scopally ambiguous sentences with that same interpretation. This could be seen as 
evidence for a logical form representation capturing scopal properties or as evidence 
for a scope reversal operation, whose application could be facilitated by a previous 
application (c.f. Quantifier Raising). We discuss the usefulness of such simple 
priming studies in linguistics. Based on the scopal ambiguity example, we show that 
priming of representation and priming of operation can be distinguished. In an 
experiment testing the relevant predictions for our test case, we obtain that (1) 
priming is based not on operations but on representations, but (2) the relevant level of 
representation encodes only scopal relations between specific quantified expressions. 
 
1. Introduction: representations and priming, the case of scopal relations 
1.1. Scopal relations and representations 
Sentence (1) contains a universal quantifier every and an indefinite, existential 
quantifier a. Depending on which of these two elements takes scope over the other, 
we obtain two possible interpretations, as paraphrased unambiguously in (2).  
(1) Every student read a book. 
(2) a. Universal-wide scope interpretation:  
    For every student s, there is a book b(s) that s read. 
b. Universal-narrow scope interpretation: 
    There is a book b, such that every student read b. 
The universal interpretation in (2)a is surface scope: the scopal relation between the 
universal quantifier every and the existential quantifier a matches the order and 
hierarchy in which they appear in (1). The interpretation in (2)b is reverse scope: the 
scopal relation is reversed between the sentence and the interpretive level.  
Our concern is an interesting finding by Raffray and Pickering (2010), who 
demonstrated that people can be primed to derive particular scopal interpretations (see 
details below). In this paper we emphasize that such priming results are useful to 
either characterize realistic layers of linguistic representations or to confirm the 
existence of linguistic operations of certain kinds. We do so by discussing two 
possible interpretations of Raffray and Pickering’s results and testing between them in 
an experiment.  
1.2. Layers of representations and priming 
Raffray and Pickering’s (2010) study involved a structural priming paradigm (e.g., 
Bock, 1986; Branigan, Pickering & McLean, 2005; Pickering & Branigan, 1998; 
Thothathiri & Snedeker, 2008; for a review see Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). 
Participants completed a sentence-picture verification task that involved matching one 
of two pictures to a scopally ambiguous sentence, such as (1). There were prime trials 
and probe trials. In prime trials, participants were forced to interpret the sentence with 
universal wide-scope (or universal narrow-scope) by the nature of the target picture, 
which contained a wide-scope image (or a narrow-scope image), and the foil picture, 
which contained an image that was inconsistent with the sentence. In the probe trials, 
which immediately followed prime trials, one of the pictures corresponded to the 
universal wide-scope interpretation of the sentence and the other to the universal 
narrow-scope interpretation. Participants were therefore “free” to choose either 
interpretation in the probe trials. Across two experiments, Raffray and Pickering  
found that participants were more likely to select the picture matching the wide-scope 
interpretation following a wide-scope prime trial than after a narrow-scope prime 
trial. In other words, participants were primed to derive sentence interpretations with 
particular scopal relations. From these results they concluded that participants formed 
disambiguated abstract representations that specify quantifier-scope relations. 
Concretely, the claim is that there exists a level of representation which looks like 
the following semi-abstract patterns for the two possible interpretations of (1):  
(3) Representations underlying the two interpretations: 
a. Universal-wide representation:      Every … is such that there is a… 
b. Universal-narrow representation:  There is a … such that for every … 
These representations abstract away from some information, e.g., the content of the 
lexical material filling in the … parts. If these representations exist, we can 
understand why the activation of one of these patterns for a given sentence (the 
prime) can strengthen the activation of the same pattern for a subsequent sentence. 
1.3. Linguistic operations and priming 
Priming effects can reveal a level of representation at which prime and probe are 
made equivalent, as discussed above. But they can also be evidence for the existence 
of some operation that applies equally to the prime and probe. In our concrete case, 
there might be an operation that transforms an interpretation of the (a) type, into an 
interpretation of the (b) type. This operation would correspond to a scope reversing 
operation, call it OSR. (An alternative plausible candidate for such an operation when 
indefinites are involved would be a domain narrowing operation, we come back to 
this in the discussion section). Such OSR operations would traditionally fall under the 
label of “movement” operations in the syntactic literature (e.g., Quantifier Raising, 
see e.g., Fox 2000). Formal and experimental results argue for the existence of such 
operations. For instance, developmental enquiries show that children under a certain 
age mostly access surface scope interpretations for a variety of configurations and 
only later the whole set of their corresponding reverse scope interpretations. This 
suggests that scope reversal is indeed a single piece in the system, an operation, either 
to be acquired or plainly acquired (see, e.g., Conroy, Lidz & Musolino 2009 for more 
detailed discussion). 
Cashing out the presentation in terms of this OSR operation, the (a) interpretation 
would follow from a representation at which hierarchical order and linear order have 
been aligned. The OSR operation could apply to this representation and reverse the 
scopal relations. In representational terms, we obtain: (b) = OSR(a). 
We can now describe an alternative interpretation of the priming effects we 
discussed, as evidence for this OSR operation. Indeed, if the application OSR has been 
applied once to the prime, it may apply again to the probe, more so than if the 
operation was not applied to the prime. Hence, we see that priming results may be 
seen as evidence for layers of representation (section 1.2) or for linguistic operations 
involved in these representations (the current section 1.3). 
1.4. Distinguishing representations and operations 
We will provide new evidence in favor of the linguistic layer interpretation, which 
was Raffray and Pickering’s (2010) original interpretation of their data and which 
may not be the most naturally available from a linguistic standpoint. Our strategy will 
be to study priming effects between sentences of different profiles. Specifically, we 
will study sentences such as (4).  
(4) A student read every book.  
(in our experiment: “There is a star above every heart”, see discussion below) 
(5) a. Universal-wide scope interpretation: 
    For every book b, there is a student s(b) that read b. 
b. Universal-narrow scope interpretation:  
    There is a student s, such that every book was read by s. 
Such sentences have the same two types of interpretations as our original example (1), 
the universal-wide interpretation and the universal-narrow interpretation. Crucially, 
however, the order of the quantifiers are reversed in the sentence: the indefinite a now 
occurs before the universal quantifier every. Hence, the two interpretations are 
obtained differently in (1) and (4) in terms of the OSR operation. Specifically, the OSR 
operation is involved to obtain the existential interpretation in the case of (1) and the 
universal interpretation in the case of (4). Hence, the surface scope interpretation of 
one sentence is the reverse scope interpretation of the other. 
If the representation account is correct, then we should find priming of 
interpretation across sentence of types (1) and (4): the universal interpretation of one 
should prime the universal interpretation of the other. If the operation account is 
correct, then we should find the opposite type of priming across these sentence types, 
such that the surface scope of one primes the surface scope of the other, i.e. a 
universal-wide interpretation of one sentence primes a universal-narrow interpretation 
of the other.1 
1.5. Extension of the prediction  
The operation interpretation based on OSR makes broader predictions. First, 
priming may occur across sentences using completely different pairs of quantifiers: 
sentences of the form Q1 V Q2 and Q3 V Q4 (where Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 are 
quantified DPs involving four different quantifiers) could prime each other’s surface 
and reverse interpretations, even though their impoverished representations as in (3) 
have nothing relevant in common. Second, radically different types of sentences 
require scope resolutions which may involve the OSR operation. For instance, negation 
may interact with a quantifier in roughly the same way in which two quantifiers 
(every and a) may interact. Consider sentence (6), which may receive the two 
interpretations paraphrased in (7) depending on whether negation takes scope over or 
below the universal quantifier every. 
(6) Every square is not red. 
(7) a. Every square is of a color that is not red = No square is red. 
b. Not every square is red (some may be red). 
Descriptively, one may recognize a surface scope interpretation and a reverse scope 
interpretation, obtained by way of an operation that could have a lot in common with 
the OSR operation. If this is correct and if Raffray and Pickering’s (2010) priming 
effect is of the second type (priming of operation), then we predict priming to occur 
within negative sentences such as (6) and between sentences of this type and those 
with two quantifiers, such as (1). If the priming effect is based on interpretation and 
representations of the type in (3), then no such priming is expected.2  
2. Experiment  
Our experiment tests whether scopal priming occurs because a representation is 
primed or because an operation is primed. Participants completed a sentence-picture 
verification task, similar to Raffray and Pickering (2010). Each trial consisted of a 
sentence and two pictures, and participants clicked on the picture that best matched 
the meaning of the sentence. The experimental trials all involved scopally ambiguous 
sentences. There were prime trials, in which the pictures dictated that only one 
meaning was acceptable, and probe trials, in which either meaning was acceptable 
(see Figure 1). Following Raffray and Pickering, we expected that the (forced) 
meaning of the sentence in the prime trials would influence the (free) meaning of the 
sentence in the probe trials. Sentences could either share the same abstract 
interpretation (e.g., universal-wide scope) across trials, or the presence of the OSR 
operation (e.g., reverse scope). Of interest was whether scope operation or 
interpretation would predict priming direction. 
We used three types of configurations (sentences): Universal-Existential (U-E), as 
in (1); Existential-Universal (E-U), as in (4); and Universal-Negation (U-neg), as in 
(6). Each configuration could result in two interpretations: the universal-wide (U-
wide) interpretation, as described in the a) examples of (2), (5) and (7), or as 
universal-narrow (U-narrow), as in the corresponding b) examples (see the 
Interpretation column of Table 1). The interpretations could also be classified with 
respect to the direction of the scope operation, surface scope or reverse scope; but, 
crucially, the mapping between interpretation and scope operation varied across 
sentences (see the Operation column in Table 1). The dissociation between 
interpretation and operation meant that the priming accounts could be differentiated. 
Priming was tested between all configurations. Thus, there were within-configuration 
trials, in which prime-probe pairs used the same configuration (e.g., E-U primes 
followed by E-U probes), and between-configuration trials, in which prime-probe 
pairs used different configurations (e.g., E-U primes followed by U-Neg probes). For 
within-configuration trials, the interpretation and operation accounts make the same 
predictions. For between-configuration U-E/E-U trials, however, the interpretation 
and operation accounts make different predictions. The interpretation account predicts 
that between-configuration priming will show U-wide primes leading to U-wide 
responses, whereas the operator account predicts that U-wide primes should lead to 
U-narrow responses. Predictions for U-neg sentences can be extracted from Table 1. 
 
2.1. Participants  
Eighty participants were recruited online using Amazon Turk. Two participants were 
removed because their native language was not English, and a further five were 
removed because their accuracy on the prime sentences was less than 90%.  
2.2. Materials 
Sentences. Experimental sentences were constructed according to one of three frames. 
- For U-E sentences:  Every [Shape 1] is [above/below] a [Shape 2] 
- For E-U sentences:  There is a [Shape 1] [above/below] every [Shape 2] 
- For U-neg sentences:  Every [Shape 1] is not [Color]  
An important remark is in order. The E-U sentences used an expletive construction 
instead of a plain indefinites, which are degraded in subject position (see discussion 
and corpus studies in Michaelis & Hartwell, 2007 and references therein). One may 
worry that this could block the possibility of a reverse scope interpretation, no matter 
how it comes about, but jumping ahead a bit, Table 2 shows that even though there is 
a bias towards a U-narrow reading, our participants also accessed the U-wide reading, 
which thus leaves room for us to investigate possible priming effects.3 
Shapes were hearts, squares, dots, triangles, stars or notes, and colors were black, 
blue, green, or red. Examples are shown in Figure 1. The list of stimuli was obtained 
by inserting colors, shapes, “above”/“below” randomly (with replacement) into the 
appropriate sentence frame. This meant different primes had different combinations of 
shapes/colors. However, there was only a single list of stimuli used for all 
participants.   
Images.  For each sentence, we constructed three types of images: a foil F consistent 
with none of the interpretations, a target image T1 consistent only with the first 
interpretation and a target image T2 consistent only with the second interpretation.4 
Each trial consisted of a sentence and two of its three associated images as follows:  
! Prime trials paired a sentence with its foil image F and one of the target images. 
The choice of the target image T1 or T2 thus forced one of the two interpretations.  
! Probe trials were obtained by pairing a sentence with its two target images T1 and 
T2. The interpretation was thus left open and the choice between T1 and T2 would 
determine which of the two interpretations was favored by the participant. 
Control trials. We included control trials using the same sentence frame, “Every 
[shape] is [color]” with one out of the two images making the sentence true. 
2.3. Design 
Primes and probes formed pairs of experimental trials. Prime trials were formed from 
one of the three sentence configurations and expressed as one of two interpretations 
(U-wide or U-narrow). Probe trials were one of 3 configurations. A complete 
experimental set therefore consisted of 3 by 2 by 3 = 18 prime-probe pairs. We 
counter-balanced the position of the target image for the prime trials (left or right) and 
whether the target probe response was on the same side as the target prime response 
to obtain 4 replications of 18 experimental pairs = 72 pairs. There were also 32 
control trials, making the total number of trials 72*2+32=176. Experimental pairs and 
control trials were presented in a different random order for each participant.  
2.4. Results 
We analyzed our data by modeling response-type likelihood using logit mixed-
effect models (Jaeger, 2008). The random effects structure was maximal in the sense 
recommended by Barr, Levy, Scheepers & Tily (2013), that is, random intercepts and 
slopes were included for all repeated measures factors (all factors where subjects were 
random effects) but only intercepts were included for between-element factors (where 
items were used as a random effects). In addition to the factors reported for the 
individual analyses below, we included prime-probe position consistency as a fixed 
factor, that is, whether the correct response to the prime was on the same side as the 
subsequent probe5. We report p-values derived from χ2 likelihood ratio test comparing 
the more complex models to simpler models, and the Wald Z p-values resulting from 
the best-fitting model. Treatment coding was used throughout.  
Trials with incorrect responses to the primes were discarded, as in Raffray and 
Pickering (2010), and also extremely rare (E-U primes: 1.3%; U-E primes: 1.4%; U-
neg primes: 1.4%). Control trials were answered accurately (2.7% error rate) and were 
also discarded.  
E-U & U-E responses – within configuration priming 
Consider first the results from the E-U and U-E sentences (those tested by Raffray 
& Pickering, 2010). The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates responses when primes and 
probes involved the same configuration, that is, within-configuration trials (E-U -> E-
U and U-E -> U-E trials; raw counts are shown in Table 2). When the probe is 
preceded by a U-Wide prime, there are more U-wide responses to the probes, 
regardless of the probe type. Both the operation and the interpretation accounts 
predict this pattern. Model analyses involving prime interpretation (U-wide vs U-
narrow) and probe type (E-U vs U-E) revealed a significant effect of prime 
interpretation (see Table 3), χ2(1) = 6.51, p  = .010, but no interaction, χ2 = 1.82, p = 
.18. Simple effects revealed that for E-U sentences there was a robust priming effect, 
χ2(1) = 6.79, p = .019, but not for U-E sentences, χ2(1) < 1. Thus, while the priming 
effects we observe seem weaker than those of Raffray and Pickering, we obtain 
substantial within-configuration priming with the same sorts of sentences.  
E-U & U-E responses – between configuration priming 
When primes and probes involve different configurations, the interpretation and 
operation accounts make different predictions. The interpretation account predicts that 
between-configuration priming will show similar effects to the within-configuration 
sentences, but the operation account predicts priming for the E-U sentences will occur 
in the opposite direction to priming for the U-E sentences. The right panel of Figure 2 
shows the between-configuration U-E and E-U probe responses. We observe 
substantial priming effects for these sentences, consistent with an interpretation 
account. More specifically, there was a main effect of the prime interpretation (U-
wide vs. U-narrow), χ2 = 11.97, p < .001, and no interaction between the probe type 
(E-U vs. U-E) and the prime interpretation, χ2 < 1. Simple effects analysis reveal 
prime interpretation had a significant effect when the prime was E-U, χ2(1) = 5.38, p 
= .020, and when it was U-E, χ2(1) = 9.38, p =. 0022. It is also possible to encode the 
prime interpretation as surface or reverse scope (see Table 1), in which case reverse 
scope priming leads to greater U-wide responses for the U-E sentences but fewer U-
wide responses for the E-U sentences, i.e., an interaction, χ2(1) = 13.19, p < .001. 
Both analyses indicate that interpretation is a good predictor of priming whereas order 
is a bad predictor.6 
U-neg sentences 
There was no significant effect of any of the prime sentences on the U-neg 
sentences, regardless of whether each prime was considered separately, U-neg -> U-
neg, χ2(1) < 1, E-U -> U-neg, χ2(1) = 1.50, p = .22, or U-E -> U-neg, χ2(1) < 1, or 
combined, with prime interpretation (U-wide vs U-narrow) and prime type (U-neg, E-
U, U-E) as factors, χ2(2) < 1, nor did the U-neg sentences prime either U-E or E-U 
probes, χ2(1)’s < 1. Although these results are consistent with an interpretation 
account, the lack of within-configuration priming makes the lack of between-
configuration priming difficult to interpret, as we discuss below. 
3. General Discussion 
The interpretation of scopally ambiguous sentences can be primed. Our experiment 
pitted priming of representations against priming of a scopal “movement” operation. 
We found evidence for the former, representation-based priming. (There may still 
exist the latter, operation-based type of priming but it is at best hidden by the former).  
Before diving into discussing their implication, we would like to discuss the 
possibility that our findings could be driven by mere “visual priming” between 
images. In essence, one may wonder whether participants are not recognizing patterns 
in the images, such that after having clicked on a U-wide picture, e.g., they would be 
attracted by a U-wide picture again (e.g., because they both embed two recognizable 
rows of three identical objects). In some of its variants, this explanation is hard to 
distinguish from priming at the semantic level, for the attraction of a particular pattern 
in an image, is very close at least extensively to attraction for a particular meaning 
(i.e. possibly a mere description of a visual pattern). There may be ways to 
disentangle the two possibilities however. One would be to make the images so that 
the U-wide “pattern” is hidden as much as possible, but that is a matter of subjective 
appreciation of salience (note that the relevant pattern has to remain visible, for 
otherwise, by definition, it would not be possible to evaluate whether the 
corresponding interpretation (=description of the pattern) is true). Raffray and 
Pickering’s (2010) obtain similar results as ours and yet their images were different 
than ours, in such a way that the pattern being tracked would have to be rather 
abstract to account for the whole dataset. An alternative control for visual priming 
may consist in maintaining the same images, but to alter the sentences in such a way 
that linguistic elements could not contribute to any observed priming effect. For 
example, removing the scopally ambiguous quantifiers in the prime sentence and 
replacing these with generic expressions, such as, “There are triangles below the 
dots.”  The absence of significant priming when there was no sentence similarity 
would indicate that priming effects were not due to visual priming. Indeed, Raffray 
and Pickering, Experiment 4, conducted just such a study and did not observe 
significant priming. In so far as our study is similar to theirs, we would expect that 
our effects were also not caused by visual priming.  
Our results surprisingly confirm Raffray and Pickering’s (2010) original 
interpretation in terms of the existence of a certain level of semantic representation. 
This level of representation is impoverished. It seems to crucially concern scope 
taking elements such as universal and existential quantifiers, to the exclusion of 
content words (even the distinction between close class words such as above and 
below7), and other scope taking elements such as negation. Impoverished levels of 
representations had also been motivated on completely independent grounds, e.g., by 
Gajewski (2002, 2009) or Fox and Hackl (2006), to separate mere tautologies or 
contradictions from plain grammatical violations.  In the future, it would be 
interesting to evaluate how the two notions can be compared and how the two 
enterprises can inform each other.  
While we find general support for Raffray and Pickering’s (2010) representational 
priming hypothesis, rather than an operational priming account, our conclusions differ 
with respect to the exact form of primed representation. Raffray and Pickering tested 
whether sentences similar to those in (4) primed sentences like (1), just as we have 
done here (see Footnote 1), but they did not observe between-configuration priming 
(whereas we did). They thus concluded that comprehenders tended to repeat scope 
assignment to quantified thematic roles, rather than the more straightforward 
representation we describe in (3) and in the paragraph above (something like the 
quantifier-order account referred to by Raffray and Pickering). There are many 
methodological differences between our study and theirs, such as the inclusion of U-
neg sentences in our study and the format of the pictures, and we cannot identify 
which of these is responsible for the difference in results, or indeed whether Raffray 
and Pickering simply observed a Type II error. Future studies may be able to isolate 
the deciding factor. We feel the important distinction, however, is not between 
different forms of representational priming, but between representational and 
operational priming, which has been the focus of this study and in which there is no 
conflict between our conclusions. 
At this point one may wonder about the status of the U-neg sentences, for which 
we failed to find priming altogether. Two broad explanations can be considered. First, 
that we failed to find priming because of some aspect of the design, such as our 
choice of stimuli. For instance, a reviewer mentioned that these sentences were 
signaled by the presence of colors in our material, such that participants could be 
guided by this color to detect the conditions they would be seeing and therefore rely 
on a shallow processing of these sentences which would not reach the level of 
representation or processing required to trigger priming. If this is the explanation then 
further studies may be more successful in obtaining these effects. Second, U-neg 
sentences might resist priming in a more fundamental way. Possibly the general 
difficulty people have with negative operators (e.g., Clark & Chase, 1972) means that 
the scope representation quickly becomes deactivated across trials. Our data cannot 
distinguish between these possibilities, but interestingly, evidence from the 
developmental literature suggests that negative scope ambiguities can indeed be 
primed under the right circumstances, suggesting the former explanation. Viau et al. 
(2010) showed that the U-narrow interpretation of U-neg sentences could be primed 
with children using a different, non-ambiguous sentence (which would amount to 
"Not every triangle is blue"). Although this is a different type of priming, with a 
different population, it is compatible with the view that U-neg priming operates at an 
impoverished level of semantic representation. 
A strong interpretation of the U-neg findings may also be useful in eliminating a 
potential source of the priming effect: The two possible interpretations stand in an 
entailment relation,8 and this could drive the priming effects: a weak interpretation 
may prime a weak interpretation. This could be understood as a bias towards 
charitability: attributing a weak reading to a sentence is a way to be “charitable” by 
maximizing the chances to make it true, and in an experimental setting as this one, 
biasing towards charitability may induce strategical behaviors which may be 
confounded with priming effects. This explanation would predict priming within and 
from U-neg sentences as well, which we did not find. However, this argument is 
based on the interpretation of a null-result, which may be explained in several other 
ways, as we discussed above. All in all, further priming investigations of how 
linguistic elements beyond quantifiers interact would be of interest not only to address 
this methodological issue, but also to evaluate whether or not similar scopal 
mechanisms apply to different kinds of scopal elements. 
Our results situate priming effects at a semantic level, at which some elements are 
interpreted (the distinction between universal vs existential quantifiers is made) and at 
which other linguistic elements are ignored. For future research, however, it would be 
interesting to evaluate whether other kinds of scopal mechanisms could explain the 
current results. For instance, one may consider that narrowing the domain down to a 
singleton may be the source of wide-scope interpretation of indefinites (see 
Schwarzschild, 2002), such that it is narrowing down of the domain that is primed, 
rather than the interpretation it leads to (thanks to Klaus Abels and Philippe Schlenker 
for discussion). To understand more, we would need to gather more information. For 
instance, one may ask whether priming is tied to the presence of an indefinite or some 
other element that plays a crucial role in the various competing approaches of 
quantifier scope taking. More generally, one could test priming across sentences 
involving different pairs of quantifiers altogether, so that the possible interpretations 
are not comparable at any level. Priming may disappear, or priming of scope 
operations may then become detectable. 
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 Table 1.  
 
Label Example Interpretation Operation  
U-wide Surface 
U-E Every club is above a heart  
U-narrow Reverse  
U-wide Reverse  
E-U There is a club above every heart 
U-narrow Surface 
U-wide Surface 
U-Neg Every heart is not red 
U-narrow Reverse 
 
Note. The Interpretation column lists interpretations of each configuration and the 
Operation column lists operations associated with each interpretation.  Note that the 
U-wide and U-narrow interpretations are different for U-neg sentences than for the 
double-quantifier configurations. This is because the universal quantifier interacts 
with negation and not with an existential quantifier, as it does for U-E and E-U 
configurations. 
 
Table 2. Counts of responses to probes. 
 
   Probes 
   U-E E-U U-neg 
   wide narrow wide narrow wide narrow 
U-E wide 203 83 231 56 251 39 Primes 
 narrow 185 98 214 70 246 41 
E-U wide 212 79 228 61 247 43 
 narrow 183 108 204 83 252 40 
U-neg wide 199 90 227 63 244 39 
 
 narrow 193 92 213 74 238 47 
Note. wide and narrow refer to U-wide and U-narrow respectively. Pairs of numbers 
correspond to responses for a given condition. For example, in the U-E wide -> E-U 
condition, 231 responses were U-wide and 56 were U-narrow. 
 
Table 3. Analyses of double-quantified sentences 
 
Within-configurations (E-U -> E-U, U-E->U-E) 
Omnibus Analysis 
Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z p - value 
best-fitting model included prime interpretation, χ2(1) = 6.51, p = .010, LL = -528 
Intercept 0.66 0.33 2.00 .045 
Probe 1.06 0.33 3.18 .0015 
Interpretation 0.66 0.20 3.26 .0011 
Simple effects 
E-U only 
best-fitting model included prime interpretation χ2(1) = 6.79, p = .0092, LL = -258 
Intercept 1.71 0.39 4.33 < .001 
Interpretation 1.16 0.29 4.04 < .001 
U-E only 
best-fitting model did not include prime interpretation χ2(1) < 1 
Intercept 0.91 0.40 2.28 .020 
Interpretation 0.14 0.29 0.50 .62 
Between-configurations (E-U -> U-E, E-U -> U-E) 
Omnibus Analysis 
best-fitting model included prime interpretation, χ2(1) = 11.97, p < .001, LL= -518 
Intercept 0.98 0.34 2.93 .0035 
Probe 0.64 0.26 2.44 .015 
Interpretation 0.88 0.19 4.56 < .001 
Simple effects 
E-U -> U-E 
best-fitting model included prime interpretation, χ2(1) = 5.38 , p = .020, LL = -252 
Intercept 1.52 0.32 4.79 < .001 
Interpretation 0.93 0.27 3.41 < .001 
U-E -> E-U  
best-fitting model included prime interpretation, χ2(1) = 9.38, p =.0022, LL = -298 
Intercept 0.85 0.32 2.67 0.0077 
Interpretation 1.03 0.26 3.98 < .001 
 Figure 1. Examples of prime trials and probe trials. 
  
 
 
Sentence configurations are shown in rows. Each cell in the table represents a single 
trial. Participants read the sentence and selected one of two pictures that best matched 
the meaning. Each prime-probe trial pair involved either a U-wide or a U-narrow 
prime, followed by a probe trial. In prime trials, only one of the two pictures was 
consistent with the sentence, whereas in probe trials both were consistent. Prime-
probe pairs could be formed by using probes of the same type as the primes (the same 
row in the table) or a different type (a different row).   
U-E 
E-U 
U-neg 
Prime(Trial N) Probe (Trial N + 1)  
U-wide prime U-narrow prime 
Every note is above a square Every triangle is below a dot Every square is below a heart 
There is a star above every square There is a triangle above every star There is a note below every dot 
Every triangle is not black Every note is not blue Every square is not blue 
  
 
Figure 2. Within and between configuration probe responses.  
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 ∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀
1 We note that Raffray and Pickering (2010) tested whether sentences like (4) primed sentences like (1) 
(Experiment 3), just as we present in this paper. They reported that there was no significant priming 
effect, and that across experiments, priming was significantly greater within sentences like (1) than 
between sentences like (1) and (4). They further argued that this provided evidence against a 
straightforward representational account such as that which we suggest above. To foreshadow our 
findings, we find significant priming effects involving sentences like (4), in contrast to Raffray & 
Pickering, Experiment 3. We discuss the difference further in the General Discussion. 
2 If the scopal operation at stake with negation is different than the one for quantifiers, we also expect 
no priming for these sentences. 
3 Thanks to reviewers for Linguistic Inquiry for prompting us to put this information back in focus. 
4 The two interpretations stand in an entailment relation but see Footnote 8. 
5 The probe position effect was never significant but its inclusion nonetheless reduced residual 
variability. 
#∀It is also possible to compare the within-expression priming effect with the between-configuration 
priming effect. This is similar to the significant cross-experimental interaction obtained by Raffray and 
Pickering (2010; Experiment 3). Unlike Raffray and Pickering, however, we did not observe 
significantly greater within-expression priming than between expression priming, χ2(1) < 1, likely 
because we observed significant between-configuration priming in the same direction as the within-
configuration priming effect, whereas Raffray and Pickering did not. 
7 When we analyzed the between expression results with predicate as a fixed factor we found a 
significant effect of prime interpretation, χ2 = 10.63, p = .0011, consistent with the analysis above, and 
no effect of predicate (same vs. different), χ2  < 1, nor any significant higher order effects involving 
predicate, χ2  < 1. This analysis suggests that the preposition is not represented at the layer of 
representation that is responsible for the priming effect we observe and at the same time argues against 
a visual priming account of our effect. 
8 This logical relation holds at the level of literal meaning. However, it is broken when further 
considerations are taken into account. In particular, the wide interpretation may come with an 
additional inference to the effect that the narrow interpretation is not compatible with it. The enriched 
wide interpretation would thus be: For every student, there is a book that this student read, and not all 
∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀∀
students have read the same book. This enrichment may arise systematically if the two interpretations 
of the sentence are in competition: the weaker interpretation will naturally come with the inference that 
the stronger interpretation is unwarranted (see Mayr & Spector, 2012, for much deeper discussion, 
whose theories of available readings crucially rely on the logical relations between surface and reverse 
scope interpretations).  
Note that breaking the entailment pattern is what allowed us to construct pictures that unambiguously 
correspond to one or the other of the interpretations. 
